Lexical Functional Grammar as a Construction Grammar

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ABSTRACT

Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) is a lexicalist, constraint-based grammatical theory that shares a lot of the basic assumptions of Construction Grammar (CxG), such as a commitment to surface-oriented descriptions (no transformations), and the simultaneous representation of form, meaning, and other grammatical information (no derivations). Nevertheless, LFG is not standardly viewed as a kind of CxG, in particular since its adherence to the principle of Lexical Integrity means that it insists on a strict morphology-syntax distinction where CxG canonically rejects such a divide. However, such a distinction is in fact entirely compatible with CxG assumptions; the actual problem with viewing LFG as a CxG is the difficulty it has in describing the more substantive end of the schematic-substantive spectrum of constructions. I suggest that by replacing the limited context-free grammar base of LFG responsible for this shortcoming with a more expressive formalism (in this case a description-based tree-adjoining grammar), we can obtain a fully constructional LFG, suitable as a formal framework for CxG.

1 INTRODUCTION

In grammatical theory, there is an important division between which parts of linguistic competence involve storage/memory and which involve computation. Exactly where the line between these two categories should be drawn is an open, and heavily debated, question.
The creativity and productivity of human language means that it is untenable to claim that everything is stored; if this were the case, it would be impossible to say anything new – we would only be able to repeat what we had already heard and memorised. This is the aspect of human language emphasised by work in mainstream generative grammar (MGG), and claims about the ‘discrete infinity’ of human language are commonly seen in the opening pages of textbooks which introduce students to natural language syntax from this perspective.

On the other hand, the arbitrariness in human language means that we cannot claim that everything is computed, either: some form-meaning pairings are the way they are for no other reason than convention, and conventions must be learned. This is the Saussurean observation about the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign: there is no more reason for dog to be used to refer to the domestic canine than any other sequence of sounds, which is precisely why languages vary in this respect (e.g. the German word for the same concept is Hund, the French chien, etc.). This arbitrariness also exists above the level of the word (see below), and it is this aspect of human language which is emphasised by work in the tradition of Construction Grammar (CxG).

A traditional view in MGG is that the things which are stored are words, collected in the lexicon, and that objects larger than the word – phrases, clauses, etc. – are arrived at by the application of general and abstract rules of syntactic composition to these lexical atoms. One problem with this view is that the arbitrariness of natural language does not stop at the word level: there are a variety of phrasal objects which do not behave as we would expect from the normal syntactic processes of the language in question, and whose meanings (and sometimes forms) therefore apparently have to be memorised. The most striking examples are idioms, whose meanings are often wholly

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1 This term is borrowed from Culicover and Jackendoff (2005), and is used to refer to work in the Chomskyan tradition, i.e. that strand of theoretical thinking that begins with Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957) and continues to the present day with work in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1993, 1995).

2 CxG refers to a family of theories which originated in the work of Charles Fillmore and colleagues in the 1980s (Fillmore 1985, 1988; Fillmore et al. 1988; Kay and Fillmore 1999), and that recognise the construction, a pairing of form and meaning of arbitrary size and varying abstraction, as the basic unit of analysis in grammatical theory. More details will be given about CxG below.
unpredictable given the meaning of their parts in other contexts (if they even exist outside the idiom), and whose syntactic structures are often anomalous or archaic:

(1) Holden pulled a rabbit out of the hat.  
≈ ‘Holden found an unexpected solution to the problem.’
(Anomalous semantics: no rabbits or hats need be involved.)

(2) The thieves have flown the coop.  
≈ ‘The thieves have escaped.’
(Anomalous semantics: no coops or flying need be involved. 
Anomalous syntax: fly does not normally take a Source direct 
object in contemporary English.)

(3) We’ve tried every which way to solve this problem, and there’s just no solution.  
≈ ‘We’ve tried every possible means of solving this problem, and there’s just no solution.’
(Anomalous syntax; not possible with other quantifiers, for example: *each which way.)

(4) We’ve let these pirates run amok for too long.  
≈ ‘We’ve let these pirates cause chaos for too long.’
(Anomalous lexical content: amok does not exist outside of this expression.)

But there are more schematic phrasal configurations which also bear unpredictable meanings, illustrated in (5)–(7):

(5) The more you tighten your grip, Tarkin, the more star systems will slip through your fingers.  
≈ ‘As you tighten your grip, the number of star systems slipping through your fingers will correspondingly increase.’
(The comparative correlative/the X-er the Y-er construction; Fillmore 1987; Culicover and Jackendoff 1999.)

(6) What’s a nice girl like you doing in a place like this?  
≈ ‘How come a nice girl like you is in a place like this?’
(The what’s X doing Y/WXDY construction; Kay and Fillmore 1999.)

(7) Bill belched his way out of the restaurant.  
≈ ‘Bill left the restaurant while belching.’
(The way-construction; Jackendoff 1992.)
Fillmore et al. (1988, 505–506) call these **FORMAL IDIOMS**, in contrast to the **SUBSTANTIVE IDIOMS** in (1)–(4). Formal idioms have more open slots which can be filled in with any appropriate word or phrase, whereas substantive idioms require specific words for their idiomatic meaning to come off. In fact, idioms exist on a spectrum from more substantive to more formal (or schematic).

Because of the existence of these larger-than-single-word expressions whose meaning and/or form cannot be computed on-line, CxG takes a different view from MGG: the building blocks of phrasal syntax are not words, but **CONSTRUCTIONS**, pairings of form and meaning of any size. Word-internal syntax is also often understood to fall under this umbrella, so that constructions extend both above and below the level of the word, with the distinction between phrasal syntax and the lexicon therefore breaking down. Instead, the grammar is simply a repository of constructions – the **CONSTRUCTICON** (Jurafsky 1992) – and some means of combining them (often unification, since constructions are often represented as feature structures).

There is quite some diversity in how this insight is cashed out, leading to an array of sometimes quite disparate theories all bearing the moniker ‘Construction Grammar’, e.g. Berkeley Construction Grammar (Fillmore 1985, 1988; Kay and Fillmore 1999), Embodied Construction Grammar (Bergen and Chang 2005), Fluid Construction Grammar (Steels 2011; Steels and van Trijp 2011), Sign-Based Construction Grammar (Sag 2010; Boas and Sag 2012; Michaelis 2015), Cognitive Construction Grammar (Lakoff 1987; Goldberg 1995, 2006), and Radical Construction Grammar (Croft 2001). Nonetheless, there are certain overriding meta-theoretical assumptions that basically all CxGs have in common, which are identified below:

1. **WYSIWYG**: Linguistic descriptions are surface oriented, or ‘WYSIWYG’ (‘What You See Is What You Get’) in nature – that is, no phonologically empty elements are assumed, and there is no abstract ‘underlying’ form which must be transformed to reach the surface representation.

2. **PARALLEL-REPRESENTATION**: All levels of linguistic analysis, both in terms of form and meaning, are present in parallel – that is, no level of representation is derived from another (e.g. meaning is not derived from form, nor **vice versa**).
3. EDL: Linguistic description has an ‘extended domain of locality’ – that is, the notion of the Saussurean sign extends above the level of the word, and form-meaning pairings can exist which necessitate dependencies between structurally distant parts of a sentence.

4. CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN: Since the notion of sign also extends below the level of the word, a corollary of EDL is that there is no absolute/discrete distinction between morphology and syntax, since words and phrases are built out of the same things: “it’s constructions all the way down” (Goldberg 2006, 18).

5. HIERARCHY: Linguistic knowledge is structured, and organised in a hierarchical fashion – often in some kind of inheritance network or type hierarchy, of the sort also assumed to structure non-linguistic knowledge.

6. CROSS-LX-VARIETY: There is a greater emphasis on cross-linguistic variety, on ‘unusual’ constructions, and on subtle connections of form and meaning than is found in MGG, for instance, where the focus is much more on ‘core’ constructions and cross-linguistic similarity.

7. USAGE-BASED: Knowledge of language is based on usage – that is, there is no strict competence-performance distinction, and we store both linguistic generalisations and specific episodic memories of linguistic events.

Within these assumptions, we can draw a dividing line between the first five, which are more about the architecture of the grammar, and the final two, which are about what you do with that grammar – i.e. what kinds of questions linguists should be asking, and where they should look for their explanations.

In this paper, I want to argue that Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG: Kaplan and Bresnan 1982; Bresnan et al. 2016; Dalrymple et al. 2019), a constraint-based, declarative grammatical theory, can be seen as another kind of Construction Grammar – or, more precisely, that it can be viewed as a suitable framework for formalising CxG ideas and analyses. For this reason, I will be focussing on the first five

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3 Cf. Lichte and Kallmeyer (2017) and Müller (2021), who undertake a similar exercise for Tree-Adjoining Grammar (TAG) and Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG), respectively.
assumptions above, since my interest is in the formal properties of LFG as a system, rather than to what ends researchers make use of the framework. 4

I begin in Section 2 with an introduction to LFG, highlighting its key features and pointing out to what extent these allow it to satisfy assumptions 1–5 above. It will be seen that it already satisfies all of them to some extent, with the notable exception of CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN: LFG self-avowedly adheres to the principle of LEXICAL INTEGRITY (LI), which means that it rejects the claim that there is no distinction between morphology and syntax.

In Section 3, however, I argue that some version of LI should be adopted by CxG (and already is in frameworks like SBCG), and therefore that the assumption of CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN ought not to be a sine qua non of CxG. On the other hand, I also argue that LFG should (and sometimes already does, albeit often implicitly) loosen the absolute distinction between morphology and syntax, since some apparent LI violations do seem to be genuine.

In fact, the problem with viewing LFG as a formalisation of CxG lies not with LI, but with its inability to handle substantive idioms satisfactorily, owing to the difficulty of describing multiword stretches in the lexicon. Section 4 examines how LFG handles some constructional phenomena, showing that existing machinery allows it to analyse many formal idioms well, but that it falls short when it comes to substantive idioms. I discuss some existing inadequate proposals, and conclude that Findlay’s (2019; to appear) proposal to replace the context-free grammar backbone of LFG with a tree-adjoining grammar would give the appropriate level of descriptive freedom to enable LFG to capture substantive idioms. With this move, LFG’s notion of ‘extended domain of locality’ is expanded to include phrase struc-

4 In its guise as a research paradigm rather than a formalism, LFG has tended to be split on assumptions 6 and 7. Cross-linguistic variety has been a major focus, especially of the Parallel Grammar project (ParGram; Butt et al. 2002), and non-configurationality has provided an important motivation for LFG’s modular architecture (see e.g. Bresnan et al. 2016, ch. 1). In keeping with its generative roots, however, LFG researchers tend to treat the competence/performance distinction as a given – although see work in LFG-DOP (Bod and Kaplan 1998) for a more usage-based approach.
Lexical Functional Grammar as a Construction Grammar

ture, meaning that lexical entries become nothing more or less than a declarative description of every level of linguistic structure in parallel – exactly what we would expect from a Construction Grammar.

LEXICAL FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR

LFG is a declarative/constraint-based (i.e. non-transformational) grammatical theory, an off-shoot of MGG stemming from a desire in the late 1970s and early 1980s to develop a more psychologically plausible and computationally tractable theory (Kaplan and Bresnan 1982, 173–174; Dalrymple and Findlay 2019, 123). In this section, I introduce some of its key machinery while considering how well it adheres to the assumptions of CxG identified in Section 1. We will see that LFG in its canonical form already shares many of them. Assumption 5, HIERARCHY, is not met by LFG ‘out of the box’, but is easily accommodated with the addition of TEMPLATES, a tool already common in computational work in LFG, and now gaining ground in theoretical work (to be introduced in Section 2.3). The status of EDL and its supposed corollary CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN is more challenging: we will see in Section 2.1 that LFG has very powerful tools for describing non-local relationships; however, LFG’s adherence to Lexical Integrity means that it assumes a strict and categorical distinction between lexicon and

\[ 203 \]
grammar, contrary to CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN (Section 3), and the format of LFG’s lexical entries hamstrings its commitment to EDL by making it impossible to handle certain kinds of constructions, especially substantive idioms, in a satisfactory way (Section 4.3).

2.1 Two levels of syntactic structure

What is generally called ‘syntax’ refers both to more imminent, ‘surfacey’ phenomena such as word order (which vary widely across the world’s languages) and to more abstract, ‘deeper’ phenomena such as subjecthood (which exhibit many more commonalities cross-linguistically). LFG formalises this distinction by positing two distinct levels of syntactic structure, C(CONSTITUENT)-STRUCTURE and F(UNCTIONAL)-STRUCTURE, which encode the different kinds of information in different data structures, and which are related by correspondence (not by derivation). C-structure is a phrase-structure tree, and represents constituency, part-of-speech categories, and word order. F-structure is a feature structure/attribute-value matrix (AVM), and represents abstract relational information about grammatical functions, agreement, long-distance dependencies, etc. The two are connected by a PROJECTION FUNCTION, $\phi$, which maps c-structure nodes onto their corresponding f-structure ($\phi$ is a function, so more than one c-structure node can be mapped to the same f-structure, but each c-structure node only maps to a single f-structure). Figure 1 gives the c- and f-structures for the sentence Jadzia loves them by way of illustration.\footnote{Figure 1 only represents the $\phi$ function on the three c-structure nodes which correspond to maximal functional projections (and which map to the three f-structures), so as to avoid visual clutter (see Dalrymple and Findlay 2019, 137–138). This does not conceal any information, since daughter nodes in each of these three projections will be annotated to indicate that they share the same f-structure as their mother, with the effect that their functional information is ‘passed up’ the tree – see below for explanation of annotations on c-structure.}

C-structure is loosely based on X-bar theory (Chomsky 1970; Jackendoff 1977), but makes a number of simplifying assumptions.\footnote{For a fuller account of the formal details of c-structure, see Dalrymple et al. 2019, ch. 3.}
1. All right-hand elements of phrase-structure rules are optional, so that there can be headless phrases (VPs without Vs, IPs without Is, etc.) – this avoids positing empty heads where no overt material fills the slot (e.g. in the analysis of English, an I node is only assumed when there is an auxiliary or modal that fills it, otherwise it is simply omitted).

2. Some categories are NON-PROJECTING (Toivonen 2003), indicated by a circumflex accent over the category label: e.g. a \( \hat{P} \) is a non-projecting P. This means that they do not project a phrase.

3. We assume there is always a rule \( XP \rightarrow X \), for any category X, which omits extraneous bar levels (this is part of a general principle called ECONOMY OF EXPRESSION; see Dalrymple et al. 2015). In addition, no phonologically empty elements are assumed.\(^9\) All of this makes LFG c-structures a much more direct representation of

\(^9\)Some versions of LFG violate this by employing traces. This was common in earlier incarnations of the theory, including Kaplan and Bresnan 1982, along with e.g. Bresnan 1995, 1998; but since the introduction of functional uncertainty (Kaplan et al. 1987; see below), it is not normally seen as part of the mainstream theory. Various handbook and textbook presentations of LFG, such as Dalrymple 2001, Börjars et al. 2019, and Dalrymple et al. 2019, do not employ traces, for example. Awkwardly, one prominent textbook, Bresnan et al. 2016, does make use of empty categories, albeit only in a heavily restricted set of cases (such as crossover phenomena – see Bresnan et al. 2016, ch. 9). However, others have convincingly argued for alternative analyses of these phenomena which remove the need for traces and empty categories in LFG altogether: see Dalrymple et al. 2001, 2007, Dalrymple and King 2013, and Nadathur 2013.
surface syntactic structure than trees in other frameworks where the
phrase-structure tree is overloaded and expected to encode functional
information as well as constituent structure. LFG takes the view that
different kinds of information require different kinds of data structure
to represent: syntactic trees are very good at encoding constituency
and linear order, but much less good at representing dependency rela-
tions between constituents (which may involve re-entrancy, cyclicity,
etc.), for which a feature structure is much better suited. By omit-
ting abstract functional information from the tree, we therefore obtain
a much more WYSIWYG c-structure: assumption 1 of CxG described
above.\footnote{Zaenen (1989) makes this explicit in a \textquote{WYSIWYG Principle}.}

Formally, an LFG grammar is a context-free grammar where the
phrase-structure rules bear annotations that describe how f-structure
is projected from the c-structure. Annotations are written using the
following abbreviations:

(8)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item \(\ast\) := the current node (the node bearing the annotation)
  \item \(\hat{\ast}\) := the current node’s mother
\end{itemize}

(9)  
\begin{itemize}
  \item \(\downarrow\) := \(\phi(\ast)\) (the f-structure of the current node)
  \item \(\uparrow\) := \(\phi(\hat{\ast})\) (the f-structure of the current node’s mother)
\end{itemize}

We can indicate that a node and its mother share the same f-structure
by writing \(\uparrow = \downarrow\):

(10)  
\[
NP \rightarrow N
\uparrow = \downarrow
\]

And we can indicate that a phrase bears some particular grammat-
ical function by using paths through f-structure in our annotations.
The rule in (11), for example, says that the f-structure of the NP in
the specifier of IP is the \textsc{subject} of the f-structure corresponding to
the IP:\footnote{For reasons of space, I will not motivate or list the grammatical functions
and features usually assumed at f-structure. For a full treatment, see Dalrymple
\textit{et al.} 2019, ch. 2.}

(11)  
\[
IP \rightarrow NP \quad I’
\quad (\uparrow \textsc{subj}) = \downarrow \quad \uparrow = \downarrow
\]
In words, the annotation below the NP says that the f-structure corresponding to its mother node, IP (“↑”), has a subject attribute (“SUBJ”), whose value is the NP’s f-structure (“↓”).

It is important to recognise that although we say that f-structure is projected from c-structure, this does not mean that f-structure is derived from c-structure in any sense. Rather, the two structures are both simultaneously present, and constrain each other mutually. (This is an important component in LFG’s adherence to PARALLEL-REPRESENTATION, which we return to in Section 2.2, where I introduce the wider LFG projection architecture.) The directionality inherent in the projection function is related to information flow rather than derivation: owing to the functional nature of ϕ, structure present at c-structure can be lost at f-structure (many nodes can correspond to a single f-structure), and cannot then be recovered in reverse (in the same way that mergers are irreversible in sound change).

Lexical entries in LFG are formally just phrase-structure rules, as in (12):

\[
(12) \quad N \rightarrow \text{Jadzia} \\
(\uparrow \text{PRED}) = \text{‘Jadzia’} \\
(\uparrow \text{NUM}) = \text{SG} \\
(\uparrow \text{GEND}) = \text{FEM}
\]

But they are usually written in a different format, shown in (13):

\[
(13) \quad \text{Jadzia} \quad N \quad (\uparrow \text{PRED}) = \text{‘Jadzia’} \\
(\uparrow \text{NUM}) = \text{SG} \\
(\uparrow \text{GEND}) = \text{FEM}
\]

The feature PRED was originally used to indicate the semantic predicate of an f-structure, but given developments in the LFG approach to semantics (see Section 2.4), its role is now really just to uniquely identify lexical items (see Andrews 2008 and Findlay 2019, 152–154 for some discussion) – cf. the role of the LID feature in SBCG (Sag 2012, 84). Lexical entries therefore almost always contain a statement identifying their PRED value at a minimum.

Annotations, whether in lexical entries or other phrase-structure rules, can refer to non-local parts of f-structure. We have seen how annotations can include paths through f-structure; in principle there is no
limit to the length of these paths. Therefore as well as simple annota-
tions like \((\uparrow \text{SUBJ}) = \downarrow\), or \((\uparrow \text{NUM}) = \text{SG}\), which describe relationships
between the f-structures of a c-structure node and its mother, or sim-
ply ascribe values to attributes within a lexical item’s own f-structure,
we can also express more distant relationships, such as FUNCTIONAL
CONTROL, illustrated in the second line of this lexical entry for the
raising verb seem:

\[
(14) \quad \text{seem} \quad \text{V} \quad (\uparrow \text{PRED}) = \text{‘seem’} \\
\quad \quad \quad (\uparrow \text{SUBJ}) = (\uparrow \text{XCOMP SUBJ})
\]

The second constraint here identifies the subject of \textit{seem} with the sub-
ject of its open complement clause (e.g. connecting \textit{Jadzia} and \textit{leave}
in \textit{Jadzia seemed to leave}), i.e. it expresses a cross-clausal dependency.

LFG also permits these paths to be expressed as regular expres-
sions over grammatical functions, meaning that they can be \textit{arbitrar-
ily} long. Such FUNCTIONAL UNCERTAINTY (Kaplan \textit{et al.} 1987) is
useful in describing long-distance dependencies, for instance. Exam-
ple (15) shows this employed in a (simplified) phrase-structure rule
for a fronted \textit{wh}-phrase in English constituent questions:

\[
(15) \quad \text{CP} \rightarrow \quad \text{XP} \quad \text{C’} \\
\quad \quad \quad (\uparrow \text{FOCUS}) = \downarrow \\
\quad \quad \quad (\uparrow \text{FOCUS}) = (\uparrow \text{COMP}^* \text{GF})
\]

The first annotation under \text{XP} identifies its f-structure with the ‘gram-
maticized discourse function’ \text{FOCUS} (Bresnan and Mchombo 1987;
Dalrymple 2001, 182–183) – this is the special function assumed to be
assigned to questioned material. But displaced constituents must also
play a grammatical role at the ‘gap’ where they are interpreted; this is
what the second annotation ensures. It says that the \text{FOCUS} also bears
some grammatical function (GF), which may be in the same clause or
may be embedded in any number of \text{COMP}lement clauses – the ‘\*' fol-
lowing \text{COMP} is a Kleene star, indicating zero or more occurences of
\text{COMP} on this path.

With the use of functional uncertainty, it is obviously possible to
describe extremely non-local dependencies between elements. Addi-
tional tools, such as OFF-PATH CONSTRAINTS (Dalrymple \textit{et al.} 2019,
ch. 6.6), have also been developed to allow further constraints to be
imposed on the paths described by such expressions, which enables
very precise specifications of very detailed and complex long-distance relationships through the f-structure. Thus, the description language of LFG allows constraints to be placed on dependencies that extend way beyond a word and its immediate sisters or dependents, which clearly affords LFG some version of EDL, assumption 3 of CxG described above.

The parallel projection architecture

Although the original formulation of LFG in Kaplan and Bresnan 1982 includes only c-structure and f-structure, subsequent developments have expanded the number of different levels of representation, i.e. the different ‘structures’, which are assumed. A contemporary view of the so-called (PARALLEL) PROJECTION ARCHITECTURE is given in Figure 2, showing the different structures and correspondence functions which map between them. All of these different structures are taken to have “their own primitives and organizing principles, and therefore

\[
\text{Form} = \begin{cases} 
\text{s-string} & \text{Interface} \\
\text{p-string} & \text{Harmony} \\
\text{p-structure} & \end{cases}
\]

Figure 2: The parallel projection architecture (Findlay 2021, 344). On the division of the string into the s-string and p-string, see Dalrymple and Mycock 2011 and Mycock and Lowe 2013. The other structures shown here are p(rosodic)-structure (Mycock and Lowe 2013), s(emantic)-structure (Dalrymple 1999; Lowe 2014; Findlay 2021), and i(nformation)-structure (Dalrymple and Nikolaeva 2011). Not shown are a rgument)-structure, which appears between c-structure and f-structure in some conceptions of the architecture (Butt et al. 1997), but which other approaches have omitted entirely (Asudeh and Giorgolo 2012; Findlay 2016); and m(orphosyntactic)-structure (Butt et al. 1996; Frank and Zaenen 2004), which has likewise been dispensed with in modern treatments (Dalrymple 2015)
their own internal structure and formal representation” (Dalrymple et al. 2019, 265 – although in practice almost all are represented as AVMs like f-structure), meaning that LFG takes a highly modular view of the grammar. Crucially, meaning is also included in this extended view of the LFG architecture, as well as information-structure, so that all kinds of form and function are, at least in principle, brought within the scope of the framework. This shows that LFG shares assumption 2 of CxG, PARALLEL-REPRESENTATION: all levels of linguistic analysis, both form and function, are represented simultaneously.

What is more, although each of these structures represents a different plane of linguistic analysis, they are not derived from one another; instead they are present in parallel, and are mutually constraining. Just as phrase-structure rules can be annotated to describe f-structure, they can also bear annotations referring to any level, e.g. a person’s name like Jadzia might specify that the ANIMate feature in its s-structure has the feature +:

\[(16) \quad \text{Jadzia N} \quad \left(\uparrow \text{PRED}\right) = \text{‘Jadzia’} \]
\[\left(\uparrow_\sigma \text{ANIM}\right) = +\]

The subscript convention here is used to make such annotations more readable. \(\uparrow_\sigma\) is equivalent to \(\sigma(\uparrow)\), and, more generally, for any structure \(s\) and any projection function \(\omega\), \(s_\omega := \omega(s)\). Such subscripts can also be iterated, so that, for instance \(\downarrow_{\sigma_\iota}\) is equivalent to \(\iota(\sigma(\downarrow))\), or, in other words, this node’s i-structure.

Thus, descriptions (on both phrase-structure rules and in lexical entries) can constrain all levels of representation simultaneously – or, rather, all levels except c-structure. For, since the annotations appear on phrase-structure rules in a context-free grammar, the scope of c-structure constraints remains within a single generation (a mother node and its daughters). We will return to this problem in Section 4.3.

2.3 Templates

It is common in programming languages to use macros of some kind to abbreviate chunks of code when they will be repeated. This has the pragmatic benefit of saving typing time, but it also makes maintaining code much easier: if something has to be changed in the chunk of code
in question, it need only be changed in one place, where the macro is
defined, rather than having to be changed at every instance of its use.
This saves time too, but, more importantly, it also avoids errors being
introduced when some instances are inevitably missed.

The computational implementation of LFG, the Xerox Linguistic
Environment (XLE: Kaplan and Newman 1997; Crouch et al. 2017),
also provides a means of writing macros – in this case they are called
TEMPLATES. In addition to their practical uses, there has, over the past
two decades, been a growing interest in the theoretical applications
of templates in LFG, as a means of expressing generalisations across
different lexical entries or parts of the grammar (Dalrymple et al. 2004;
Asudeh et al. 2014; Findlay 2020, 132–133). Since templates are just
abbreviations, a grammar with templates is extensionally equivalent
to one without, but the former will be able to express generalisations
that the latter cannot.

One area where templates can capture generalisations is in ab-
reviating annotations that frequently co-occur. For instance, any
distinctively third-person singular verb in English will share the sec-
ond and third lines of this lexical entry for loves:

\[ \text{loves} \ V \ (↑ PRED) = 'love' \]
\[ \ (↑ SUBJ PERS) = 3 \]
\[ \ (↑ SUBJ NUM) = SG \]

We can therefore define a template 3SG-SUBJECT that abbreviates this
information:

\[ 3SG-SUBJECT := \]
\[ \ (↑ SUBJ PERS) = 3 \]
\[ \ (↑ SUBJ NUM) = SG \]

Now we can rewrite the lexical entry for loves by ‘calling’ this template,
indicated by prefixing the template name with an ‘@’ symbol:

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12 These annotations illustrate how agreement works in LFG: an agreeing sub-
ject (e.g. Jadzia loves ...) will provide the same values for these features as the
verb does, meaning the specifications are compatible; by contrast, a non-agreeing
subject (e.g. *We loves ...) will cause a feature clash in its f-structure, since it will
specify different values for its PERSON and NUMBER features (e.g. 1 and PL in
this case).
Templates can be parametrised, as in (20), so that they take one or more arguments, allowing even more flexibility:

(20) \[ \text{TENSE}(t) := \]  
\[ (\uparrow \text{TENSE}) = t \]

Notably, templates can also be nested, as shown in (21) and (22):

(21) a. \[ 3\text{-SUBJECT} := \]  
\[ (\uparrow \text{SUBJ PERS}) = 3 \]  

b. \[ SG\text{-SUBJECT} := \]  
\[ (\uparrow \text{SUBJ NUM}) = SG \]

(22) \[ 3\text{SG-SUBJECT} := \]  
\[ @3\text{-SUBJECT} \]  
\[ @SG\text{-SUBJECT} \]

That is, a template can call one or several other templates in its definition. This nesting creates an implicit hierarchy between templates:

(23) \[ 3\text{-SUBJECT} \quad SG\text{-SUBJECT} \]
\[ \quad 3\text{SG-SUBJECT} \]

Such a hierarchy is different from a typical inheritance hierarchy – it is an inclusion hierarchy instead (Asudeh et al. 2013, 17–19). This is because templates, in common with LFG descriptions generally, allow the use of Boolean operators like negation or disjunction. For example, alongside the 3SG present tense form \textit{loves}, we have the complementary form \textit{love}, used for all other person/number combinations in the present tense. We can describe this distribution by simply negating the 3SG-SUBJECT template:

(24) \[ \text{love} \quad V \quad (\uparrow \text{PRED}) = \text{‘love’} \]  
\[ \neg @3\text{SG-SUBJECT} \]

But now both \textit{love} and \textit{loves} will be daughters of 3SG-SUBJECT in the template hierarchy, since both \textit{include} the template, even though in one case this is only under negation:
In principle, all functional annotations in a grammar could be abbreviated in templates and appropriately related to one another. This would provide LFG with a hierarchical organisation of linguistic knowledge, bringing it in line with assumption 5 of CxG, HIERARCHY.\textsuperscript{13} In practice, however, theoretical work in LFG has not pursued this endeavour in a thoroughgoing way (though see Asudeh \textit{et al.} 2013 and Przepiórkowski 2017 for case studies), and so the framework does not yet live up to the claim by Goldberg that in CxG “the network of constructions captures our grammatical knowledge of language \textit{in toto}” (Goldberg 2006, 18) – although only for contingent rather than principled reasons.

\textit{Meaning in LFG}  

Any theory which purports to explain human language needs to have an account of meaning. In particular, it needs to explain how meanings can be arrived at compositionally, allowing us to express new ideas with existing, limited, resources. LFG remains wholly agnostic about how meanings \textit{per se} should be represented – in keeping with its modular approach, this is not a question for the framework overall, but for the particular module which deals with semantics. What is crucial, though, is how this module connects to the rest of the grammar: in other words, the syntax-semantics interface. There has been some variation over the years in how this has been conceptualised within LFG, and in particular about the necessity and/or role of s-structure in this (on which see Findlay 2021, especially §3), but the \textit{de facto} standard approach to the syntax-semantics interface in contemporary LFG is GLUE SEMANTICS (Glue: Dalrymple \textit{et al.} 1993; Dalrymple 1999).

\textsuperscript{13} Work in CxG generally makes use of \textit{inheritance} hierarchies, and therefore LFG’s template inclusion hierarchies may not seem like such a good fit. It remains an open question, however, what exactly the hierarchical structure of the grammar should look like, and further work is needed to determine the theoretical implications of choosing an inclusion rather than an inheritance hierarchy.
For our purposes, most of the details of this theory are not relevant, but it will nonetheless be useful to have some tools to describe how LFG handles the pairing of form and meaning, and so in this section I give a brief introduction to Glue for LFG. For a fuller introduction to the theory, the reader is directed to Asudeh 2012, ch. 4 or Dalrymple et al. 2019, ch. 8.

Meaning contributions in Glue are handled by so-called MEANING CONSTRUCTORS, which pair an expression in some meaning language (here a simple predicate calculus) with a logical expression that both gives the type of that meaning and connects it to the syntax – this logical expression is called the glue term, since it bonds the semantics to the syntax. Semantic composition is logical deduction: parsing a sentence gives us a collection of meaning constructors, and we use their glue terms to construct a proof terminating in the type of the sentence itself.

Glue Semantics uses LINEAR LOGIC (Girard 1987) as the logical language for the second part of a meaning constructor. Since it lacks the structural rules of weakening and contraction, this logic has the property of RESOURCE SENSITIVITY, meaning that premises are ‘used up’ in deriving a conclusion. This has the – desirable – consequence that meanings cannot be re-used or discarded in the process of composition. For example, *Jadzia loves Worf* cannot mean *love*(jadzia, jadzia) (‘Jadzia loves herself’), where we use the meaning of *Jadzia* twice and ignore the meaning of *Worf*.14

A simple meaning constructor is given in (26):

\[
(26) \quad \text{jadzia} : e^\uparrow
\]

The meaning language side introduces a constant *jadzia*, while the linear logic side says that this is of type *e* and is associated with $\uparrow$: in a lexical entry this means the pre-terminal node’s f-structure, i.e. the lexical item’s own f-structure.15

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14 On the more widespread relevance of resource sensitivity to linguistic theory, see Asudeh 2012, ch. 5.

15 In much of the Glue Semantics literature, types are associated with s-structures rather than f-structures, but for our purposes f-structures are sufficient, and avoid us being drawn into unresolved disputes about the exact content
A more complex meaning constructor appears in (27):

\[(27) \quad \lambda x. \lambda y. \text{love}(x, y) : e_{\text{(SUBJ)}} \rightarrow e_{\text{(OBJ)}} \rightarrow t\]

This has a two-argument function on the left-hand side, and on the right-hand side a linear logic expression with two implications. This second part shows the \(\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle\) type of the function on the left (‘\(\rightarrow\)’ is right-associative), and also links its first argument to its f-structure subject and its second to its f-structure object. Read as an implication, the glue term can be thought of as saying the following: “If I am provided with something of type \(e\) corresponding to my subject, and if I am then provided with something of type \(e\) corresponding to my object, I will provide something of type \(t\) corresponding to my own f-structure (i.e. the f-structure of the clause)”.

Of course, combining types means nothing if we don’t also combine meanings. Glue achieves this by appealing to the CURRY-HOWARD CORRESPONDENCE (Curry and Feys 1958; Howard 1980): proof steps in a constructive logic (like linear logic) correspond to specific operations in the lambda calculus. Most notably, implication elimination (i.e. modus ponens) corresponds to functional application, while implication introduction (i.e. hypothetical reasoning) corresponds to lambda abstraction. This means that as we compose the types on the right-hand side of a meaning constructor, the left-hand meanings are also combined appropriately. Let us see how this works with an example.

Meaning constructors are included in lexical entries just like other annotations. For the sentence Jadzia loves Worf, we can assume the (very simplified) lexical entries in (28)–(30):

\[(28) \quad \text{Jadzia N } (\uparrow \text{PRED}) = ‘\text{Jadzia}’
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{jadzia : } e & \\
\end{array}
\]
The (abbreviated) f-structure for the sentence is shown in (31). The different structures have been labelled to allow us to refer to them directly.

(31) \[
\begin{array}{l}
PRED 'love' \\
SUBJ j[PRED 'Jadzia'] \\
OBJ w[PRED 'Worf'] \\
\end{array}
\]

We can now obtain a set of INSTANTIATED meaning constructors from the lexically contributed meaning constructors in (28)–(30) by replacing the descriptions on the linear logic side with the names of the f-structures they describe in (31):

(32) \[
\begin{align*}
jadzia : e_j \\
worf : e_w \\
\lambda x. \lambda y. \text{love}(x, y) : e_j \to e_w \to t_l
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, we can use these to construct the proof in Figure 3, where each step corresponds to an instance of modus ponens/function application. As we can see, we arrive at the correct meaning for the sentence, namely love(jadzia, worf).

![Glue proof for Jadzia loves Worf](image)

### Summary

We have now seen briefly some key components of LFG, and I believe this has illustrated how many of the core assumptions of CxG it already shares. Its surface-oriented syntax, represented at c-structure, means
that it adheres to WYSIWYG. The parallel projection architecture gives us PARALLEL-REPRESENTATION: all levels of linguistic structure exist in parallel, mutually constraining one another. The existence of tools like functional uncertainty gives us an important degree of EDL; although c-structure remains problematic, something we will explore more fully in Section 4, it is clear that overall LFG is perfectly capable of expressing a variety of complex constraints across arbitrary distances. Lastly, HIERARCHY can be achieved through the use of templates to organise and modularise linguistic description, even though this approach has not been followed through to completion in theoretical work in LFG.

One problem arises, however, when it comes to CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN. LFG professes to adhere to the principle of Lexical Integrity (LI), whereby syntax and morphology are strictly separated, and the morphological structure of words is invisible to the syntax. Crucially, the LI claim that “words are built out of different structural elements and by different principles of composition than syntactic phrases” (Bresnan and Mchombo 1995, 181) would appear to be at odds with the CxG credo that “no strict division is assumed between the lexicon and syntax” (Goldberg 1995, 7). Since “LFG assumes a strict version of the Lexical Integrity Principle” (Dalrymple et al. 2019, §3.3), this would seem to be a serious obstacle to viewing LFG as a CxG. In the next section, we will examine LI and see that it may not prove as great an obstacle as appearances would suggest.

LEXICAL INTEGRITY

The principle of Lexical Integrity claims that the smallest items the (phrasal) syntactic component of the grammar can ‘see’ are words. That is, word-internal morphological structure is not accessible to the syntax, and so there is an important division between the syntax on the one hand and the lexicon on the other, which may also be taken as an important division between the computational system underlying syntax and that underlying morphology.
Building on the proposals of Chomsky (1970), the principle of Lexical Integrity was first formulated by Lapointe (1980, 8) as the Generalized Lexicalist Hypothesis:

(33)  **Generalized Lexicalist Hypothesis:**

No syntactic rule may refer to elements of morphological structure.

In the forty plus years since this original formulation, many different versions have been proposed, but all make the same basic claim: there is some kind of ‘firewall’ between syntax and the lexicon, with the latter feeding the former, but not *vice versa*. Perhaps the most succinct specification of this is given by Anderson (1992, 84):

(34) **Principle of Lexical Integrity:**

The syntax neither manipulates nor has access to the internal structure of words.

A whole paradigm of linguistic theories exist, called LEXICALIST theories, which are defined by their adherence to the principle of Lexical Integrity – LFG is one such theory. LI has featured explicitly in LFG analyses from the very start (Bresnan 1982; Simpson 1983), and appears in textbook/handbook presentations of the theory (Falk 2001, 26; Bresnan *et al.* 2016, 92; Börjars *et al.* 2019, 28; Dalrymple *et al.* 2019, 135–136). And there are good *prima facie* reasons to believe that LI is valid: many phenomena that it predicts to be impossible are indeed so. For example, gapping can be applied to words but not sub-lexical elements (examples from Simpson 1991, 51):

(35)  a. John liked the play, and Mary, the movie.

    (gapping of *liked* permitted)

   b. *John liked the play, and Mary dis- it.

    (gapping of -liked not permitted)

And sub-parts of words cannot be modified independently of the whole (examples from Williams 2007, 354):

(36)  a. How complete are your results?

   b. *[How complete]-ness do you admire?
Although *how* can modify *complete* in (36a), it cannot do so when *complete* is part of a larger word, *completeness*, as in (36b). Note that the deviancy of (36b) is not because its meaning is incoherent: its meaning is perfectly grammatically expressed by (37a). And it is entirely possible for *how* to modify *complete* inside a nominal expression, provided that nominal expression is phrasal, as shown in (37b) (Williams 2007, 354):

(37)  
   a. What degree of completeness do you admire?  
   b. How complete a record do you admire?

These data notwithstanding, CxG is often understood as rejecting a strict separation of morphology and syntax – this is the assumption I called CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN above. Since constructions are pairings of form and meaning, and morphemes also fit this description, there is therefore no fundamental distinction between morphemes and words. Rather, all constructions exist on a lexicon-syntax spectrum, varying in particular in terms of SCHEMATICITY, i.e. how much the phonological form is specified by the construction. At the more lexical end of the spectrum, we have words and morphemes, which are fully specified for phonological form (e.g. *cat* has the form /kæt/, at least in British English); at the more syntactic end, we have abstract phrasal constructions, which are radically underspecified for phonological form (e.g. the so-called N-P-N construction, exemplified in phrases like *hour by hour*, *cheek to cheek*, and *attack after attack*, which has a non-compositional semantics and imposes various restrictions on its parts – the nouns must be count nouns, cannot have a determiner, etc. – but is compatible with a wide variety of nouns and (a more limited variety of) prepositions: see Jackedoff 2008).

Taken naïvely, therefore, the LFG and CxG positions are clearly incompatible, and so LFG would be unsuitable as a formalisation of CxG. But whether or not LI is valid is an empirical question, not (just) a matter of formalism. And answering it would resolve the rift between LFG and CxG one way or the other. If it is valid, then CxG should abandon CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN in its strictest interpretation and move closer to LFG. Alternatively, if it is not, then LFG should abandon LI and move closer to CxG. So, what are the facts?
Alongside the putative evidence in favour of LI presented above, there is also apparently equally clear counterevidence. For instance, phrases and even entire clauses can host derivational and inflectional suffixes in English:

\[(38)\]
\[\begin{align*}
&a. \text{His general } \text{[ok-with-less-than-we-should-aim-for]-ness} \text{ makes him an undesirable candidate.} \quad \text{(Bruening 2018, 6)} \\
&b. \text{He } \text{[I-don’t-care]-d his way out of the room.} \quad \text{(Carnie 2000, 91)}
\end{align*}\]

This seems to be a clear example of syntax being ‘visible’ to morphology, since phrasal material can be used as input to a morphological process (suffixation).

Another apparent counter-example is the possibility of coordinating certain prefixes:

\[(39)\]
\[\begin{align*}
&a. \text{[pre- and even to some extent post]-war (economics)} \\
&b. \text{[pro- as opposed to anti]-war} \\
&c. \text{[hypo- but not hyper]-glycaemic} \quad \text{(Spencer 2005b, 82)}
\end{align*}\]

\[(40)\]
\[\begin{align*}
&a. \text{[mono- and tri]-syllabic} \\
&b. \text{[pro- and en]-clitics} \\
&c. \text{[socio- and politico]-economic} \\
&\text{(Siegel 1974, 147, cited in Strauss 1982, 43)}
\end{align*}\]

In German, this also extends to verbal prefixes, leading to gapping constructions similar to (35):

\[(41)\]
\[\begin{align*}
&\text{Peter } \text{be- und Maria ent-lud } \text{den LKW.} \\
&\text{Peter BE- and Maria un-loaded the truck} \\
&\text{‘Peter loaded and Maria unloaded the truck.’}
\end{align*}\]

In all these cases, it seems that morphology is visible to syntax, since coordination is an operation in the phrasal syntax but here it is being applied to parts smaller than words.

Some have seen evidence such as this as damning. Marantz (1997, 207), for example, declares that “[l]exicalism is dead, deceased, demised, no more, passed on …”. All the same, more than

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16 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this example.
20 years later, Bruening has to again declare the lexicalist hypothesis “both wrong and superfluous” (the subtitle of Bruening 2018); apparently, earlier reports of lexicalism’s death were greatly exaggerated (to – further – misquote Mark Twain). In fact, the empirical situation is fraught, and none of the data presented in this section are unproblematic. For instance, Bruening (2018, 23–29) purports to explain the sub-lexical gapping and modification data in (35) and (36) in syntactic terms which make no reference to the notion of word, thus rendering LI superfluous. At the same time, the phenomenon of sub-lexical coordination illustrated in (39)–(40) is not at all as thoroughgoing as we might expect were morphology and syntax truly underpinned by exactly the same combinatory system. For although some English prefixes can be coordinated, others emphatically cannot:  

\[(42)\]

a. *[un- or re]-tie  
b. *[i{n|m}- or ex]-port  
c. *[ex- and se]-cretions  

\(\text{(Spencer 2005b, 82)}\)

\(\text{(Siegel 1974, 147)}\)

And it does not seem to be possible at all with suffixes:

\[(43)\]

a. *fear-[some and -less]  
b. *thought-[ful and -less]  
c. *interest-[ed and -ing]  

\(\text{(Strauss 1982, 43)}\)

Lieber and Scalise (2007, 3) therefore express a sort of compromise position, admitting that LI cannot be valid in a strict sense, but viewing it as a kind of default or strong tendency: “we know that

\[\text{[ 221 ]}\]

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17 The distinction appears to be between what Siegel (1974) calls Class I and Class II prefixes. Class I prefixes are both morphologically and functionally ‘closer’ to the stem: they always appear nearer to the stem than Class II prefixes, for example, and unlike their Class II counterparts they can affect lexical stress assignment. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the prefixes in (42) that resist coordination are Class I – their closeness to the stem is reflected in their inability to be separated from it by a syntactic process like coordination. Note that the same class of prefixes can behave differently in different languages, however: the German Im- und Export, for example, is apparently impeccable. (One can also find hits online for im- and export in English, but many of these seem to be in forum posts written by German speakers: see, for example, https://adobe.ly/3PoQKpo or https://bit.ly/42U4o75 [accessed June 22nd 2023].)
morphology and syntax interact, and that this interaction is not a
one way affair: morphology sees syntax and syntax sees morphol-
ogy. Nevertheless this two way interaction is highly constrained”. This is echoed more recently by Cappelle (2022, 204), who points out that “[a]ny randomly selected stretch of discourse is likely to prove that morphologically complex words stay together as undivided units and that they tend not to include any above-word-level compo-
nents”.

Ultimately, a large part of the problem is this: deciding whether one or another piece of linguistic data is a LI violation depends hugely on one’s other theoretical assumptions (Desjardins 2023, 19–20), and so the enterprise of proving or disproving LI by looking for support-
ive or problematic constructions in the world’s languages is a largely hopeless one. There are, however, systematic differences between morphology and syntax at a higher level of abstraction that plead for a principled separation between the two.

Firstly, morphology applies strict ordering constraints on mor-
phemes, even in languages where the syntax imposes no ordering con-
straints. For example, case markers and verbal inflection in Latin al-
ways follow the stem, even though any of the six permutations of the
three words in (44) is grammatical:

(44) a. mil-es coqu-um laud-at.
    soldier-NOM cook-ACC praise-3SG.PRES.INDIC
    ‘The soldier praises the cook.’

    b. *es-mil coqu-um laud-at
    c. *mil-es um-coqu laud-at.
    d. *mil-es coqu-um at-laud.

And, of course, morphemes from different words cannot be inter-
leaved, even though discontinuous constituents are permitted (Snijders 2012, 2015, 211–212). That is, so-called ‘free word order’ languages are not ‘free morpheme order’ languages.

Secondly, and perhaps more foundationally, there are important differences in the computational complexities of morphology and syn-
tax (Asudeh et al. 2013, 4–5). Morphology falls almost entirely within
the class of finite-state languages (Roark and Sproat 2007, ch. 2),
Lexical Functional Grammar as a Construction Grammar

with the sole exception being unbounded reduplication (Culy 1985). Syntax, on the other hand, falls almost entirely within the class of context-free languages, with the sole exception being cross-serial dependencies (Shieber 1985). Assuming there is no formal difference between morphology and syntax, as CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN would have it, then this contrast is puzzling. As Asudeh et al. (2013, 5) put it:

[i]f morphology has the full power of syntax, why are there no clear morphological equivalents of unbounded or nested dependencies? [...] Similarly, why do we fail to find reduplication in the syntax, if there is no important formal distinction between morphology and syntax?

Note that the claim here is not merely that morphology is less powerful than syntax, but that the two systems are in fact disjoint: there are syntactic phenomena, like unbounded or nested dependencies, which we do not observe in morphology, and there are morphological phenomena, like reduplication or root-and-pattern, which we do not observe in syntax.

I am not aware of any arguments in the literature which have addressed these concerns, and they seem to strongly suggest that we need to be able to distinguish between processes happening above the level of the word and processes below. Any framework that makes this

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18 See Wang and Hunter 2023 for a minimal extension to the class of regular languages designed to account for just this kind of pattern.
19 See Partee et al. 1990, 480–482 for a proof that English is not a finite-state language, and see Gazdar et al. 1985 for a comprehensive syntactic theory which is nonetheless self-avowedly context free.
20 Even though Shieber’s findings show that the human language faculty must in general be capable of learning languages which are at least mildly context-sensitive in their strong generative capacity, further evidence of the necessity of greater-than-context-free power has not been abundantly forthcoming. It seems entirely plausible, as Pullum and Rawlins (2007, 285) opine, that languages simply vary in this respect. Perhaps non-context-freeness is a typological corner case, and designing our formalisms around it is merely generalising to the worst case.
21 Contrastive Reduplication in English (Do you LIKE HIM-like him?) offers a potential counter-example to the idea that reduplication is not found in the syntax, since it has been claimed to obey (morpho)syntactic rather than purely prosodic constraints (Ghomeshi et al. 2004).
impossible ought to be treated with a degree of suspicion, therefore. So, is CxG such a framework?

In fact, the CxG position may have been overstated by its critics (or, depending on your point of view, the CxG position may be thought of as unclear/non-committal). On the same page that Goldberg (1995, 7) makes her oft-cited claim that “[i]n Construction Grammar, no strict division is assumed between the lexicon and syntax”, she goes on to clarify that “[i]t is not the case, however, that in rejecting a strict division, Construction Grammar denies the existence of any distinctly morphological or syntactic constraints (or constructions)”. It would seem our choice is not, therefore, between two extreme positions – on the one hand, a strict version of LI where syntax and morphology are computationally distinct processes, and, on the other, the obliteration of LI and total collapse of the syntax-morphology boundary. Rather, a third way is possible (and indeed espoused by Goldberg), where syntax and morphology operate under the same computational system, but where a formal distinction is drawn between morphemes, words, and phrases, meaning that linguistic processes can be sensitive to these contrasts (see Ackema and Neeleman 2004 for a similar approach outside of CxG).

This approach is readily embodied by any type-driven framework. For example, a standard HPSG type signature includes the sub-section shown in (45) (Przepiórkowski and Kupść 2006, §3.3):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{sign} \\
\text{PHON} \\
\text{SYNSEM} \\
\text{word} \\
\text{phrase} \\
\text{DTRS} \\
\end{array}
\begin{array}{c}
\text{phon} \\
\text{synsem} \\
\text{list} \\
\end{array}
\]

Here we see that words and phrases are both sub-types of sign, and that what defines a sign is the pairing of phonological form with syntactic and semantic information (SYNSEM). That is, “both lexical and syntactic constructions are essentially the same type of declaratively represented data structure: both pair form with meaning” (Goldberg
But since *word* and *phrase* are still distinct types, it remains possible for certain constructions to be more restrictive: for example, ‘morphological’ constructions can be defined as those which require their mother to be specifically of type *word* (while ‘syntactic’ constructions require that their daughters (*DTRS*) merely be of type *sign*). I have illustrated this point with HPSG since it makes the cut so clearly and succinctly, but the same point could be made with HPSG’s explicitly constructionist cousin, Sign-Based Construction Grammar (SBCG: Boas and Sag 2012; Michaelis 2015),\(^{22}\) which likewise recognises an early cleavage between lexical constructs and phrasal constructs (cf. Sag 2010, 499). In other words, even existing implementations of CxG do not take rejection of LI as a *sine qua non*.

CxG can therefore be made to fit with Lieber and Scalise’s (2007, 18) conclusion “that the interaction between word formation and syntax goes both ways, but that nevertheless it is quite restricted”: there are formalisms for CxG which do not in themselves preclude syntax-morphology interactions, but do give a means of restricting it and/or only permitting it on a construction-by-construction basis. What of LFG, then? LI must be weakened, it seems; but how easy is this to do?

As it happens, LFG already sanctions a weaker than strict interpretation of LI. In one common LFG formulation of LI, its scope is limited to c-structure:

\[(46) \quad \textbf{Lexical Integrity:} \]

Morphologically complete words are leaves of the c-structure tree, and each leaf corresponds to one and only one c-structure node.

\[\text{(Bresnan et al. 2016, 92)}\]

That is, words are syntactic atoms when it comes to phrasal constituency, but when it comes to functional information, the internal morphological features of a word may very well be visible to syntax.

This view is well motivated, since there are numerous instances where what is expressed analytically in one language is expressed syn-

\(^{22}\) Sag (2007, 403, 2010, 486) is explicit about SBCG being simply a variant of HPSG. In fact, HPSG is itself fundamentally constructionist, even though it does not bear the ‘construction grammar’ name (Sag 1997; Müller 2021).
theoretically in another (Asudeh et al. 2013, 7–9). For instance, future tense in Romance languages can be expressed via verbal inflection, whereas English uses an auxiliary (Asudeh et al. 2013, 7):

(47)  
a. il arriver-a. (French)  
\[ \text{He arrive-3SG.FUT} \]  
‘He will arrive’  
b. He will arrive.

While the c-structures of these sentences will differ, since the French tree has two terminal nodes and the English three, their f-structures will be identical:

(48)  
a.  
\[ \text{IP} \]  
\[ \text{NP I'} \]  
\[ \text{N I} \]  
\[ \text{il arrivera} \]  
\[ \text{PRED ‘arrive’} \]  
\[ \text{SUBJ} \]  
\[ \text{PRED ‘pro’} \]  
\[ \text{GEND MASC} \]  
\[ \text{NUM SG} \]  
\[ \text{PERS 3} \]  
\[ \text{TENSE FUT} \]  

b.  
\[ \text{IP} \]  
\[ \text{NP I'} \]  
\[ \text{N I VP} \]  
\[ \text{he will V} \]  
\[ \text{arrive} \]  
\[ \text{PRED ‘arrive’} \]  
\[ \text{SUBJ} \]  
\[ \text{PRED ‘pro’} \]  
\[ \text{GEND MASC} \]  
\[ \text{NUM SG} \]  
\[ \text{PERS 3} \]  
\[ \text{TENSE FUT} \]  

In English, the attribute-value pair \langle TENSE, FUT \rangle is contributed by syntax, whereas in French, it is contributed by morphology. In the latter case, the syntax, in the form of f-structure, can clearly ‘see’ the morphological features of words, even though c-structure is blind to morphological structure. That is, the syntax sees that arrivera contributes a

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An instance of the cross-linguistic phenomenon whereby, to use the LFG slogan, “morphology competes with syntax” (Bresnan 1998).
future tense feature, but it does not see that it is specifically the suffix -a which does so.

Thus, it is not true that morphology is wholly isolated from syntax in LFG, but it remains true that morphological structure is. In fact, this view is quite in keeping with one formulation of LI, that of Di Sciullo and Williams (1987, 49), whereby “words have ‘features’, or properties, but these features have no structure, and the relation of these features to the internal composition of the word cannot be relevant in syntax – this is the thesis of the atomicity of words, or the lexical integrity hypothesis, or the strong lexicalist hypothesis”. Falk’s (2001, 26) suggestion that “[l]exical integrity as understood by LFG […] is a limited sort of lexical integrity” is thus perhaps a little premature, but does highlight that LI in LFG is limited to c-structure; by contrast, the contribution of a single word can be spread throughout f-structure, giving the impression of undermining said word’s atomicity. The orthodox view in LFG is therefore perhaps more in line with Cappelle’s (2022, 196) conclusion that LI should be reformulated “as a principle forbidding the manipulation of words, rather than access to word-internal structure” – ‘manipulation’ of words would correspond to splitting them up at c-structure.

As such, however, even this weakened version of LI would disallow the coordination of affixes seen in (39)–(40), and certainly the phrases hosting affixes seen in (38). So it may well be that LFG has to accept even greater concessions. There is some lurking awareness of this in the LFG literature. Analyses occasionally make use of ‘sub-lexical’ entries; that is, lexical entries for morphemes, written as if they were leaves in the c-structure tree, in clear violation of LI (e.g. King 1995; Nordlinger 1998; Marcotte 2009; Bresnan et al. 2016). Usually, it is implied (though often not stated explicitly) that these have no formal status, and should instead be viewed as descriptions of generalisations over lexical entries (of the sort that would nowadays be captured by templates), but sometimes suggestions are made to incorporate actual sub-lexical phrasal syntax (Marcotte and Kent 2010). Recent work in the LFG variant Lexical-Realizational Functional Grammar (L_{R}FG: Melchin et al. 2020; Asudeh et al. 2021; Asudeh and Siddiqi 2022, to appear) takes this as its starting point, and assumes a rich sub-lexical syntactic structure, inspired by Distributional Morphology (Halle and Marantz 1993), thus rejecting LI wholesale. As
argued above, however, this may be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Mainstream LFG has tended to adopt a halfway-house solution, using non-projecting categories (Toivonen 2003), which can be adjoined at the X⁰ level, to represent the kinds of elements that exist somewhere between word and morpheme. This treats LI as the default position, but allows a controlled relaxation of it in certain circumstances – such an approach has been used in the analysis of case (Spencer 2005a) and compounding (Lowe 2015), for example.

To sum up: the abolition of the distinction between word and phrase or morphology and syntax implied by a strict reading of CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN is not a necessary (or indeed empirically justified) tenet of CxG; at the same time, the absolute separation of the two implied by a strict reading of LI is not a necessary (or indeed empirically justified) tenet of LFG either. There is therefore ample room for common ground between the approaches, and we need not see the conflict between CONSTRUCTIONS-ALL-THE-WAY-DOWN and LI as a reason to dismiss LFG as a formalisation of CxG. But we are not home and dry yet! The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the best way to validate a theoretical claim is to see it implemented. In the following section, therefore, I will demonstrate how LFG handles constructions. We will see that many formal idioms, including argument structure constructions, can be handled comfortably, and that the formalism actually accommodates divergent theoretical perspectives. However, when it comes to substantive idioms, we run into problems, and a change to the framework is needed.

4 CONSTRUCTIONS IN LFG

So far, although I have argued that LFG has potential as a formal framework for CxG, we have not seen any examples of LFG analyses of constructional phenomena. This section will provide just that. We begin in Section 4.1 with Goldberg-style argument structure constructions, and show that LFG is compatible with either a lexical or constructional view of argument structure. Section 4.2 then shows how LFG can handle (some kinds of) formal idiom, but concludes that the presence of arbitrary phonological material (i.e. words) that
does not (appear to) contribute compositionally to the meaning of the
construction causes problems: the more lexically filled a construction
is, the more difficult it is for LFG to accommodate it. This is clearly
most problematic for substantive idioms, which are the subject of Sec-
tion 4.3.

**Argument structure constructions**

Recent work in LFG+Glue has treated argument structure not as a
separate level of the projection architecture (as in e.g. Butt *et al.* 1997;
Kibort 2007) but as a phenomenon at the syntax-semantics interface
(Asudeh and Giorgolo 2012; Asudeh *et al.* 2014; Findlay 2016, 2020;
Przepiórkowski 2017; i.a.). This research adopts a neo-Davidsonian
event semantics (Parsons 1990), whereby the meaning contribution
of a verb is not a predicate of or relation between individuals, but
rather a predicate of eventualities (events or states) conjoined with
a number of semantic role predicates that relate participants to that
eventuality. For example, rather than the traditional meaning in (49),
a verb like *sneezes* would have the meaning in (50):

(49) $\lambda x.\text{sneeze}(x)$

(50) $\lambda x.\lambda e.\text{sneeze}(e) \land \text{agent}(e, x)$

This opens up the possibility of splitting the valency information apart
from the lexically-specified eventuality predicate, as in (51):

(51) a. $\lambda e.\text{sneeze}(e)$

   b. $\lambda P.\lambda x.\lambda e.\text{P}(e) \land \text{agent}(e, x)$

The result of applying (51b) to (51a) is (50), but by factoring out these
two components of meaning we have separated out the core lexical
meaning from what would be seen in CxG as the constructionally-
provided argument structure meaning (Goldberg 1995). This means
that the same core lexical meaning can be used across diathesis al-
ternations (Asudeh and Giorgolo 2012) or other argument structure
frames (Asudeh *et al.* 2014).

Of course, in Glue Semantics these meaning terms are paired with
a linear logic type which anchors them in the syntax:
Using \( v \) as the type of events, we can see that the meaning constructor in (52b) consumes the meaning constructor in (52a) to produce a dependency on the verb’s subject.

We can combine the core meaning with other valency templates to produce other constructional meanings. For instance, we can represent the English caused-motion construction (Goldberg 1995, ch. 7), exemplified in (53), with the meaning constructor in (54): \(^{24}\)

Frank sneezed the tissue off the table.

\[
\lambda P.\lambda x.\lambda y.\lambda Q.\lambda e. P(e) \land \text{agent}(e, x) \land \text{theme}(e, y) \land \text{goal}(e, Q) :
\]

\[
(v \downarrow \circ t\uparrow) \circ e_{(\uparrow \text{OBJ})} \circ (e_{(\uparrow \text{OBL})} \circ t_{(\uparrow \text{OBL})}) \circ v \downarrow \circ t\uparrow
\]

This will require that the verb be accompanied by an OBJECT and an OBLIQUE in the syntax. If these dependents are not present, this meaning constructor will be unusable, since there will be no meaning constructors which match the types required. (We return to this point momentarily.)

For the sake of brevity, let us name our two argument structure frames using templates:

\[
\text{AGENT-FRAME} := \lambda P.\lambda x.\lambda e. P(e) \land \text{agent}(e, x) :
\]

\[
(v \downarrow \circ t\uparrow) \circ e_{(\uparrow \text{OBJ})} \circ v \downarrow \circ t\uparrow
\]

\[
\text{CAUSED-MOTION-FRAME} := \lambda P.\lambda x.\lambda y.\lambda Q.\lambda e. P(e) \land \text{agent}(e, x) \land \text{theme}(e, y) \land \text{goal}(e, Q) :
\]

\[
(v \downarrow \circ t\uparrow) \circ e_{(\uparrow \text{OBJ})} \circ e_{(\uparrow \text{OBL})} \circ t_{(\uparrow \text{OBL})} \circ v \downarrow \circ t\uparrow
\]

One possibility is to associate these with the verb sneezes in the lexicon, as shown in (57). This represents what Müller and Wechsler

\[^{24}\text{I assume the second argument of the goal predicate is a relation expressing a location, e.g. } \lambda x. \text{off}(x, t, y[\text{table}(y)]) \text{ in this case, and therefore has a functional type in the linear logic.}\]
(2014) call a lexical approach to argument structure, as opposed to
the phrasal, or constructional, approach of e.g. Goldberg (1995), and
which we discuss below.

(57) sneezes V (↑ PRED) = ‘sneeze’
λe.sneeze(e) : v↑ → t↑
{[@AGENT-FRAME |
       @CAUSED-MOTION-FRAME | . . . ]}

The third clause in (57) expresses a disjunction, and is intended to
include all the other potential argument structure constructions that a
verb like sneezes might enter into. Such disjunctions can themselves be
encoded in templates which name different types of verb, for example,
thus allowing generalisations to be captured (of the type that would
be captured by lexical rules in other approaches, or indeed in earlier
LFG analyses).

Recall that if we choose the CAUSED-MOTION-FRAME, the verb
must be accompanied by an object and an oblique argument. If these
dependents are not present in the syntax, we will have a situation of
RESOURCE DEFICIT in the semantics (Asudeh 2012) – there will be too
few meaning constructors for the valency frame constructor to con-
sume, and so no valid proof for the sentence. This results in ungram-
maticality. The effect of this is that the various argument structure
constructions are only licensed when the verb is in the correct synt-
tactic environment, but this is achieved without actually placing any
constraints on the syntax: the constraints are instead on the syntax-
semantics interface.

In addition to the lexical approach, LFG is also compatible with
the alternative, constructional view, whereby the argument structure
frames are associated not with the lexical entries of verbs, but with
particular phrasal configurations, as illustrated in (58) and (59). This
is because LFG annotations can be added to phrase-structure rules
just as well as to lexical entries (since formally lexical entries just are
phrase-structure rules).

(58) IP → NP I’
       (↑ SUBJ) = ↓
       ↑ = ↓
       {[@AGENT-FRAME | . . . ]}
Notice that we are still underspecifying the phrase structure associated with these templates; for example, CAUSED-MOTION-FRAME will still be present on a V′ node even when it does not have the correct number of daughters, viz. an object and oblique alongside the verb. This is possible because of the disjunctive approach, which relies on resource sensitivity to select only the appropriate meaning constructor(s). But of course nothing stops us associating the constructional meaning with more specific phrase-structure rules either, if this is preferred for theoretical reasons:

\[
V′ \rightarrow V \uparrow = \downarrow \{ @\text{CAUSED-MOTION-FRAME} | \ldots \}
\]

Much ink has been spilled on the question of whether argument structure is best analysed as a lexical or constructional/phrasal phenomenon (see, among others, Goldberg 1995, 2006, 2013; Müller 2002, 2006, 2018; Tomasello 2003; Goldberg and Jackendoff 2004; Müller and Wechsler 2014). In particular, Müller (2018) provides a detailed critique of exactly the phrasal LFG approach sketched above, highlighting numerous empirical problems. It may well be the case that argument structure should be handled lexically, therefore; but it is also true that at present most CxG approaches do not do this, and instead take the phrasal view, following Goldberg (1995). LFG as a formalism is thus capable of expressing the canonical CxG view, even though we might ultimately reject such a view on empirical grounds. At the same time, though, LFG also provides for the possibility of a lexical analysis (or, in fact, what Goldberg 2013, 447–448 calls a “derivational verb template” analysis). The main point of this section is therefore that the formalism of LFG offers the analytical flexibility to make the choice about argument structure either way, depending on which theoretical stance one takes. Indeed, and in keeping with the CxG focus on diversity and variety in linguistic phenomena, the LFG formalism in fact allows us to allocate argument structure meanings lexically or constructionally on a case by case basis, thus offering a more
empirically responsive, and perhaps less ideologically driven, kind of theorising.

**Formal idioms**

4.2

These same techniques can be applied quite liberally to all manner of constructional meanings. For example, Asudeh *et al.* (2013) give a very detailed analysis of related ‘traversal’ constructions in Swedish, English, and Dutch, illustrated in (61) by the English *way*-construction:

(61)  

a. Sarah elbowed her way through the crowd.  
b. Sarah whistled her way across the room.  

(Asudeh *et al.* 2013, 12)

This has the special meaning that Sarah traversed the crowd/room, and that either the means (as in (61a)) or the manner (as in (61b)) of this traversal was the activity described by the main verb. None of the words in (61) normally conveys this meaning alone, so it seems to emerge from the construction itself.

However, Asudeh *et al.* (2013) argue that the constructional meaning need not be hosted by a phrasal configuration, since in English there is nothing special about the syntax of the *way*-construction. As in (61), it employs a standard [V NP PP] configuration, which is witnessed by many other constructions. Rather, what is special about the *way*-construction is the obligatory presence of the word *way* – Asudeh *et al.* (2013, 30) therefore choose the lexical entry for this word as the host of the constructional meaning (highlighted here with a box):

(62)  

\[
\text{way} \quad \text{N} \quad (\uparrow \text{PRED}) = \text{‘way’}  
\lambda x.\text{way}(x) : e_{\uparrow} \rightarrow t_{\uparrow}  
\left(\text{@ENGLISH-WAY}\right)
\]

---

25 When reproducing formal analyses from Asudeh *et al.* 2013, I omit some detail to avoid unnecessary exposition, and modify some expressions to bring them into conformity with the choices made in this paper. This does not affect any of the arguments made here, but the reader should be aware of the discrepancies, and should consult Asudeh *et al.* 2013 for the formal details.
This is the normal lexical entry for run-of-the-mill way, with the addition of an optional constructional meaning constructor (optional-ity is indicated by surrounding a piece of description in parentheses), abbreviated by the template ENGLISH-WAY. I will not unpack this meaning here, since the higher-level principle can be grasped without going into the details of the analysis, but it adds the additional traversal meaning to the clause, and makes the verb of which way is the object either the means or the manner of this traversal event. Note that the normal meaning of way is not optional in (62), and therefore survives in the constructional use too; in fact, it is equated with the path through which the traversal event proceeds (Asudeh et al. 2013, 30–31), enabling a straightforward analysis of instances where way is modified or possessed by something other than the subject (Asudeh et al. 2013, 13):

(63) a. As ambassador, Chesterfield negotiated [Britain’s way] into the Treaty of Vienna in 1731.
   b. In these last twenty years Richard Strauss has flamed [his meteoric way] into our ken – and out of it.

The Swedish traversal construction analysed by Asudeh et al. (2013), called the directed motion construction (DMC) by Toivonen (2002), is illustrated in (64):

(64) a. Sarah armbågade sig genom mängden.  
   ≈‘Sarah elbowed her way through the crowd.’  
   (Asudeh et al. 2013, 13)

   b. Han ljög sig ut ur armén.  
   ≈‘He lied his way out of the army.’  
   (Toivonen 2002, 315)

This differs from the English construction in that it only has a means (not a manner) interpretation, and that there is no equivalent of way, i.e. a fixed word which is always present. Although the presence of the (simplex) reflexive, here illustrated by sig, is obligatory, its form will change depending on the person and number of the subject, with which it agrees (e.g. it will be mig for a 1SG subject, dig for 2SG, etc. – see Toivonen 2002, 322). Asudeh et al. (2013) therefore suggest that
the constructional meaning here *should* be associated with a particular phrasal schema (Asudeh et al. 2013, 22):

\[(65) \quad V' \rightarrow V \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{PP} \quad \uparrow = \downarrow \quad (\uparrow \text{OBJ}) = \downarrow \quad (\uparrow \text{OBL}) = \downarrow \quad \downarrow \text{PRONTYPE} = \text{SIMPLEX-REFL} \]

Once again, note that all of the normal meanings for the words involved in the DMC persist in the constructional meaning. The construction introduces additional meaning, in the form of a new traversal event etc., but does not replace any existing meanings.

Just as we saw above with argument structure constructions, the approach of Asudeh et al. (2013) illustrates the analytical flexibility that LFG affords researchers: constructions, in the theory-neutral sense, can be given either a lexical or phrasal analysis, depending on (i) the details of the construction itself and/or (ii) broader theoretical concerns (or preferences). For instance, it would be wholly possible to associate the ENGLISH-WAY template, and its constructional meaning, with a special phrase-structure rule just like in Swedish, rather than hosting it in the lexical entry for *way*. The only substantial change would be the addition of a requirement that the NP the template annotates have the PRED value ‘way’, since, unlike Swedish, there is a specific lexical element which is obligatory in the English construction. This would arguably be a less direct way of encoding such a requirement, but the important point is that the formalism leaves one free to make such decisions on theoretical grounds alone – no choice is imposed by the framework.

So far so good, then! We have seen that LFG has tools at its disposal which enable it to handle constructional phenomena. However, what these constructions all have in common is that they involve extra meaning being added on top of the standard, literal meanings of their parts. Sometimes meanings are also ‘realigned’, e.g. the main verb of the way-construction is relegated from expressing the main predicate of the clause to merely expressing the means or manner of the traversal event, but none are discarded. Indeed, the resource sensitivity of Glue Semantics makes this quite difficult to do. But plenty of constructions have meanings that do not merely make unconven-
tional use of the meanings of their parts, but actually override or ignore them.

For example, in the WXDY construction, illustrated in (66), both \textit{what} and \textit{doing} do not contribute their usual semantic content: the construction is not asking for the identity of an activity being undertaken – indeed, there need not be any ‘doing’ happening at all (this is especially clear when the subject is inanimate, as in (66b) and (66c)).

(66)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item What are your children doing playing in my garden?
\item What do you think your name is doing in my book?
\item I wonder what the salesman will say this house is doing without a kitchen.
\item What’s a nice girl like you doing in a place like this?
\end{enumerate}

(Kay and Fillmore 1999, 3, 5)

It seems the only way to give a satisfactory LFG analysis of this construction would be to have special versions of \textit{what} and \textit{doing} which either contribute no meaning or contribute some part of the overall constructional meaning instead of their usual semantic content.\textsuperscript{26} Such a move may be empirically adequate, but it rather flies in the face of CxG assumptions, since now the construction is distributed through the lexicon and grammar rather than being represented in one place: even if the whole constructional meaning can be encoded in a single template on a special phrase-structure rule, we still need to have two new lexical entries for the special versions of \textit{what} and \textit{doing}.

\textsuperscript{26}Equivalently, one could stick to a single lexical entry for each word, but give a disjunctive specification of its meaning, with the ‘empty’ or construction-specific meaning as one of the disjuncts (see also footnote 30 below). Alternatively, one might imagine keeping the regular lexical entries but using specially-designed, construction-specific meaning constructors to ‘throw away’ the literal meanings (cf. the MANAGER RESOURCES of Asudeh 2012, 128–134) – this is the approach proposed by Arnold (2015) for idioms like \textit{kick the bucket}. However, such a strategy is ultimately untenable, since it makes radically incorrect predictions about modification (specifically, that it should be possible to vacuously modify words whose meanings are removed in this way – e.g. \textit{What’s a nice girl like you doing carefully in a place like this?} ought to have the same meaning as (66d)); see Findlay 2017, 228–229 for more details.
And this will only multiply as more constructions are considered. (See Section 4.3.2 for further discussion.)

So, we can conclude that LFG is well suited to handle highly schematic idioms, since these involve overlaying additional meaning on existing lexical resources, but that as constructions become less schematic and more substantive, problems begin to arise. In the next section, I examine some attempts to confront these challenges, and suggest a different solution.

Substantive idioms

Alongside intermediate constructions like WXDY, there are fully substantive idioms like the following:

(67) a. Don’t worry; we still have our ace in the hole.
    (ace in the hole ≈ ‘(hidden) resource or advantage’)

b. Chrisjen likes to be kept in the loop.
   (in the loop ≈ ‘informed (about a particular matter)’)

c. Pull yourself together, man! We’re not giving up that easily!
   (pull oneself together ≈ ‘calm down/compose oneself’)

d. These new import regulations really take the biscuit.
   (take the biscuit ≈ ‘be especially egregious/shocking/annoying’)

e. If you let the cat out of the bag too early there will be trouble.
   (let the cat out of the bag ≈ ‘reveal the secret’)

In these kinds of idioms, the literal meanings of the words involved simply do not appear – they are replaced wholesale by different, idiomatic meanings. This is a major problem for the approach of Asudeh et al. (2013). Taking the biscuit, for instance, involves no taking event and no contextually salient biscuit, but unless we do something to prevent it, precisely these meanings will be introduced by the standard lexical entries for take, the and biscuit. So even if we also introduce a meaning for ‘be especially egregious’ via some constructional template (associated with a phrase-structure rule or with one or more of the words themselves), we still need to do something with the ‘left
over’ literal meanings – that is, we find ourselves in a state of RESOURCE SURPLUS: there will be no way to successfully incorporate these meanings into the linear logic proof, and so the sentence will be ruled out by the grammar.

There is also the secondary challenge of ensuring the idiomatic meaning only arises when all of the required words appear in the correct configuration. This is precisely what makes these idioms substantive: their parts cannot be switched out, even for semantically very similar constituents. E.g. in the ring does not have the idiomatic meaning of in the loop, nor yank oneself together the idiomatic meaning of pull oneself together.\(^{27}\)

The fundamental problem is that the only level at which phonological form is paired with meaning in LFG is in the lexicon, and the lexicon contains only words.\(^{28}\) As we saw in the previous section, abstract phrasal configurations can also be paired with meanings, and words can be associated with complex meanings that reference structurally distant parts of the phrase, both of which give LFG the appearance of licensing phrasal constructions more generally. But there is no way of assigning specific meanings to structurally complex multiword units, and this is why substantive idioms are challenging. In this section, I will present two potential solutions to this problem, before advocating for a third way, more in keeping with the intuitions of CxG.

\(^{27}\)There are, however, cases where substantive idioms are distorted for communicative effect, e.g. using shatter the ice as an intensified version of break the ice ‘remove or lessen the tension at a first meeting’ (McGlone et al. 1994). See Findlay 2019, 43–47, 84–87, 92–96, 321–335 and references therein on lexical flexibility in substantive idioms more generally and on metaphorical extensions to idioms.

\(^{28}\)This is not exactly true of the LFG formalism stricto sensu, since there is no obstacle to writing phrase-structure rules whose right-hand sides contain a mixture of terminals and non-terminals. In practice, however, this does not happen, presumably because it runs contrary to the lexicalist style of theorising. It is important to note, though, that such mixed rules still only permit description of a single generation in the tree, i.e. the daughters of a single mother node, so it does not make it possible to associate phonological form and semantic content across truly unbounded spans of c-structure – on which see Section 4.3.3.
Since the only locus of phonological form-meaning pairing in LFG is the lexicon, one very simple solution to the problem of substantive idioms is to deny their multiword status and instead treat them as “words with spaces” (Sag et al. 2002), so that they can be given lexical entries. This is probably the correct analysis for lots of the more morphosyntactically rigid idioms, i.e. what Sag et al. (2002) call FIXED EXPRESSIONS – those whose parts do not inflect and cannot be manipulated by syntactic processes – such as the examples in (68):

(68)  
  a. all the same  
  b. by the by  
  c. in short  
  d. no can do

These can be represented in the grammar as if they were single words (Dyvik et al. 2019), i.e. single c-structure terminals, since they cannot be interrupted or split up (i.e. they obey the strictures of LI):

(69) all_the_same  Adv  \( \uparrow \text{PRED} \) = ‘all-the-same’  
     etc.

(70) All the same, I forgive you.

\[ \text{IP} \]
\[ \text{AdvP} \]
\[ \text{IP} \]
\[ \text{Adv} \]
\[ \text{I forgive you} \]
\[ \text{all_the_same} \]

Indeed, there exist several expressions which are superficially very similar to these but which are written without spaces, and therefore already treated as single words:

(71)  
  a. although (cf. all though)  
  b. nonetheless/nevertheless (cf. none/never the less)  
  c. notwithstanding (cf. not withstanding)

If the difference here is purely an accident of orthography, then we are right to treat the expressions in (68) analogously, as single words.
Of course, many substantive idioms are not so fixed as to be amenable to an analysis as single words. This is clear from the fact that their sub-parts can be inflected, modified, and manipulated syntactically (which can lead to discontinuous linearisation):

(72) **Inflection:**
That takes/took/has taken/will take the biscuit.

(73) **Modification** (Findlay 2017, 212):

a. Musicians keep composing songs 'til they [kick the proverbial bucket].
   \((kick \ the \ bucket \approx \text{'die'}\)"

b. Britney Spears [...] [came apart at the mental seams].
   \((come \ apart \ at \ the \ seams \approx \text{‘to be in a very bad state; to fall to pieces’}\)

c. Maybe by writing this book I’ll offend a few people or [touch a few nerves].
   \((touch \ a \ nerve \approx \text{‘annoy/upset someone by referring to a sensitive topic’}\)

d. Tom won’t [pull family strings] to get himself out of debt.
   \((pull \ strings \approx \text{‘exploit connections’}\)

(74) **Syntactic Manipulation:**

a. They finally [spilled the beans].
   \((spill \ the \ beans \approx \text{‘reveal the secret(s)’}\)

b. [The beans] were finally [spilled].
   (passivisation)

c. I really want to see [the beans] he [spills] under oath.
   (relativisation)

d. But [which particular beans] did he [spill]?
   (wh-fronting)

Each of these phenomena would be extreme violations of LI if the expressions in question were really single words.

It is this kind of data which motivates the CxG view that constructions (which can be of any size), not words, are the real building blocks of the grammar. Nonetheless, much recent theoretical work
on idioms has sought to avoid this conclusion and instead view idioms as licensed lexically.²⁹ In these theories, substantive idioms are treated as being made up of special versions of the words they contain, whose meanings combine to give an appropriate meaning for the whole construction. For example, there will be a special version, or a special sense, of spill that means ‘reveal’, and a special version or sense of beans that means ‘secrets’, so that the meaning of spill the beans can be ‘reveal the secrets’. We will call this the LEXICAL AMBIGUITY approach (hereafter ‘LA’; cf. Findlay 2017, 213), since it (i) treats idioms lexically, and (ii) does so by introducing ambiguities (e.g. beans is now ambiguous between literal ‘beans’ and idiomatic ‘secrets’).³⁰

This kind of theory naturally explains the data in (72)–(74): it is no surprise that the parts of such expressions can be manipulated or modified, since they are just ordinary words, with their own meanings. It also explains why these expressions inhabit ordinary syntactic structures (like a verb+object VP).

However, this approach faces a number of issues (see Findlay 2019, 58–77 for a detailed critique). Firstly it must address the “collocational challenge” (Bargmann and Sailer 2018, 12): if beans can mean ‘secrets’ in spill the beans, how do we stop it from having this meaning elsewhere?

(75)  #Have you heard the beans?
      (≠ ‘Have you heard the secrets?’)

²⁹ This trend can be observed in many different frameworks, including, surprisingly, those which are, or have the potential to be, constructional: Sailer 2000 in HPSG, Kay et al. 2015 in SBCG, Lichte and Kallmeyer 2016 in LTAG, and Arnold 2015 in LFG. See also Bargmann and Sailer 2018. An early computational approach can be found in Fischer and Keil 1996.

³⁰ Lichte and Kallmeyer (2016) draw a distinction between LA approaches that invoke what they call a syntactic ambiguity, i.e. those which treat the different meanings of idiom words (like spill or beans) as belonging to different lexemes, and LA approaches that invoke what they call a semantic ambiguity, i.e. those which treat the idioms words as single, polysemous lexemes, rather than collections of homonymous ones. While most LA approaches take the former, syntactic, view, and so this is what I present in the text, Lichte and Kallmeyer (2016) advocate for the latter, semantic, view, and argue that it has formal, empirical, and psycholinguistic advantages. Mutatis mutandis, the challenges I note below still apply to this polysemy-based version of LA, however.
Although this may ultimately be surmountable through the use of (fairly extreme) selectional restrictions (see e.g. Sag 2007; Kay et al. 2015 for examples), it is not as straightforward as might be assumed, especially when parts of idioms can be separated across clausal boundaries and may not bear any direct syntactic relationship to each other, as is the case with the relativisation example in (74c) (Findlay 2017, 214–215). In this sentence, *spill* and *beans* bear no direct syntactic relationship to one another; instead, the relationship between them is mediated via a (in this case unpronounced) relative pronoun (see Dalrymple et al. 2019, 665–671 for the LFG analysis of relative clauses).\(^{31}\)

Secondly, although LA makes sense for so-called decomposable idioms (what Nunberg et al. 1994 call IDIOMATICALLY COMBINING EXPRESSIONS), where the meaning of the idiom can be distributed among its parts, it is much less clear what the motivation might be for applying it to non-decomposable ones (what Nunberg et al. 1994 call IDIOMATIC PHRASES), where this is not the case. For example, we can well imagine a special meaning for *pull* such that it means ‘exploit’ and *strings* such that it means ‘connections’, which explains why (73d) has the meaning it does: *family* modifies the meaning ‘connections’ of *strings*, so that the sentence means that it is family connections which Tom refuses to exploit. But now consider idioms like *kick the bucket* (≈ ‘die’) or *shoot the breeze* (≈ ‘chat’). In neither case can we readily assign meanings to the parts individually; rather, the complex whole has a simplex meaning – expressible by a single word in English.\(^{32}\) Only one word need host the meaning, therefore, and it is a wholly arbitrary decision which one we choose.\(^{33}\) Perhaps we assign the head

\(^{31}\) Falk (2010) advocates on the basis of such problematic data for eliminating this “mediated” analysis of relative clauses altogether, though this proposal has not been widely adopted, perhaps owing to the increased formal complexity it introduces.

\(^{32}\) Of course, in keeping with the Principle of No Synonymy (Bolinger 1968; Goldberg 1995, 67), these paraphrases are necessarily inexact. *Kick the bucket* possesses entailments lacking in *die*, for instance, such as punctuality (*#she lay kicking the bucket for months* is decidedly infelicitous when compared with *she lay dying for months*); and *shooting the breeze* refers to a particular kind of aimless chit-chat, not just chatting in general.

\(^{33}\) A reviewer points out that the “idiomatic mirroring” approach of Lichte and Kallmeyer (2016) alleviates this problem: since the meaning of a non-
kick the meaning ‘die’, and then have versions of the and bucket which make no semantic contribution at all (or at most a vacuous one). But we could equally well assign the ‘die’ meaning to the or bucket and then have the others words empty of meaning (see Findlay 2019, 67–74 for a discussion of these and various other possibilities explored in the LA literature). For non-decomposable idioms, LA is purely a technical solution, and no longer has any empirical motivation – unlike for decomposable idioms, where the parts were individually modifiable.

Thirdly, this strategy will lead to a massive proliferation of semantically empty lexical items – the lexicon will expand by as many entries as there are words in substantive idioms. This is because each semantically empty word must have its distribution constrained to a particular idiom so as to meet the collocational challenge. But this means the semantically empty the of kick the bucket, constrained to appear as the specifier of idiomatic bucket, cannot be the same as the semantically empty the in shoot the breeze, and so on. Note that the situation is dif-

decomposable idiom is assigned to all of its parts, there is no decision to be made about where it should live. This is true, but does not mean their proposal escapes the charge of arbitrariness, for it shares with any LA approach the lack of independent motivation in the case of non-decomposable idioms. The only reason to assume that bucket means ‘die’ or that breeze means ‘chat’ is that they appear in larger phrases which have those meanings; there is no theory-external reason to believe they bear those meanings independently. Lichte and Kallmeyer (2016, 124–125) suggest that the existence of the expression bucket list shows that bucket in fact does have this meaning independently, but Findlay (2019, 70–71) gives multiple reasons to doubt this. A limited analogical creation such as this does not show that there is a word bucket meaning ‘die’ that has an independent existence outside the idiom; the parts of such expressions cannot freely be used productively, for instance: there is no #bucket book in which to write one’s bucket list, nor a #breeze room where one could shoot the breeze with a friend, etc. The idiomatic mirroring of Lichte and Kallmeyer (2016) is therefore just as guilty as any other LA approach of assigning meanings to words for no reason other than to serve the theory.

Other approaches avoid having a proliferation of semantically empty words, but still face a blow-up in the lexicon due to the problem of properly constraining the distribution of idiom words. Bargmann and Sailer 2018 is one such example; see Findlay 2019, 71–73 for discussion. In the “idiomatic mirroring” approach of Lichte and Kallmeyer (2016), the lexicon is not expanded in quite the same way, since the difference between idiom words and their regular counterparts is treated as one of polysemy rather than homonymy, meaning there is just a single
different from that of e.g. expletive *it* or *there* in English (used in weather expressions like *it rains*, existential constructions like *there is/are*, and raising constructions like *it seems that* or *there seem(s) to be*), where we are happy to posit just a single lexical entry for each. This is because *it* and *there* occupy argument positions, and so their distribution will be constrained by standard well-formedness conditions, e.g. Completeness and Coherence in LFG (Dalrymple et al. 2019, 50–53). 35 By contrast, the grammar will freely permit NPs with and without determiners, which means that if we have an unconstrained semantically empty *the*, an NP like (76) will be ambiguous between a definite reading, where *the* has its usual semantic value, and a bare plural (generic) reading, equivalent to (77), where *the* is semantically inert:

(76) The students (are hard-working.)

(77) Students are hard-working.

Completeness and coherence cannot help us here, since we are dealing with the internal structure of an argument NP, rather than the presence or absence of an argument. Besides, we want the grammar to license both the strings in (76) and (77), it’s just that the determiner in (76) must be the contentful one. This is why any hypothesised semantically empty *the* must have its distribution restricted to the idiom lexical entry for each word. However, this approach is not thereby off the hook: while it may not explode the lexicon, it avoids this by pushing the complexity into the individual lexical entries. So while it’s true that there need not be as many new lexical entries as there are words in substantive idioms, there will instead be as many new *senses* as there are words in substantive idioms. This means that common words like *the* will still be a problem, since, by idiomatic mirroring, they must possess a different meaning for each substantive idiom which they are part of, and so they will become massively ambiguous. That is, in addition to its literal meaning, the word *the* must also mean ‘die’ (*kick the bucket*), ‘chat’ (*shoot the breeze*), ‘get angry’ (*fly off the handle*), ‘sleep’ (*hit the hay*), etc., etc. It is certainly not apparent *a priori* that this situation is preferable to the constructional view which stores the idiom in a single place, and thus only expands the lexicon by as many entries as there are idioms.

35 Constraining the distribution of expletives is one area where the resource sensitivity of Glue cannot straightforwardly replace syntactic constraints on valency like Completeness and Coherence. See Asudeh 2012, 113 for some discussion of this problem.
Lexical Functional Grammar as a Construction Grammar

it is associated with, and this leads to the lexical explosion described above.

Findlay (2019, 74–76) discusses several more problems for LA, including difficulties with syntactically idiosyncratic expressions, and incompatibility with psycholinguistic evidence. But in fact what I consider the most damning objection is this: LA does not capture (in fact rejects) the most significant fact about substantive idioms – namely, that they have an ontological status as wholes. As Williams (2007) somewhat sardonically puts it, “[a] traditional view of idioms is that they are ‘things’, that is, linguistic units”. But LA bends over backwards to deny this: substantive idioms have no status as linguistic units; instead, they are conspiracies of single words. In a framework like LFG, where the only pairings of phonological form and semantic content allowed are words, this is the only strategy available. But such a strategy is flagrantly opposed to the CxG view of idioms, making this the real obstacle to considering LFG a suitable formalism for CxG.

4.3.3 Constructional LFG

If substantive idioms are to be ‘things’ in the grammar, we need to have a way of listing them. At present, LFG cannot do this, since phrase-structure rules, the basic building blocks of the grammar (of which lexical entries are a subset), only describe c-structure relations between a mother and her daughters, nothing more remote. But of course, “constructions need not be limited to a mother and her daughters, but may span wider ranges of the sentential tree” (Fillmore et al. 1988, 501), so in order to adequately describe constructions, something needs to change.

There is another reason to reach the same conclusion, from an LFG-internal perspective. At present, LFG lexical entries include a functional description which gives details of all levels of structure except c-structure. This description can also include very long-distance relations within or between structures expressed by functional uncertainty paths. But descriptions of c-structure are limited to mother-daughter relations: the lexical entry identifies the category of the pre-terminal node which hosts it (i.e. its mother) and nothing else. Such a discrepancy is striking, and it is natural to want to remedy it.

This limitation comes from the decision to use a context-free grammar (CFG) for the description of c-structure. While this has
practical benefits in terms of parsing, it limits the expressive power of c-structure descriptions to this smaller, mother-daughter, domain of locality. Findlay (2019, ch. 5, to appear) therefore proposes to replace the CFG with something more expressive, namely a tree-adjoining grammar (TAG: Joshi et al. 1975; Joshi and Schabes 1997; Joshi 2005; Kallmeyer 2010, ch. 4). Although this increases the expressive power of c-structure descriptions, it does not alter the computational complexity of the LFG formalism as a whole: LFG already has more than context-free power (Berwick 1982; Nakanishi et al. 1992), and, even at its most constrained, is still slightly more powerful than a TAG (being equivalent to a LCFRS – see Wedekind and Kaplan 2020). By moving to a more expressive tree formalism, LFG can, however, more completely embrace the CxG assumption of EDL.

Findlay’s (2019, ch. 5) proposal employs a description-based TAG (Vijay-Shanker 1992) and makes use of lexical entries which contain descriptions of the tree corresponding to the maximal functional projection of the lexical item, as is standard in LTAG (Schabes et al. 1988) – e.g. nouns are represented as NPs, but verbs are represented as clausal trees containing positions for their arguments. Parsing, in this version of LFG, consists of gathering up all the descriptions associated with the lexical items in a sentence, and then finding the minimal structures – including c-structure – which jointly satisfy them.

Under this view, lexical entries are descriptions, i.e. lists of constraints, which cover all levels of the projection architecture simultaneously. Of course, there is now no requirement that such lexical entries describe only a single word, or indeed that they describe any word – the objects we are talking about are simply descriptions of pieces of linguistic structure. The class of such objects subsumes what are called constructions in CxG, i.e. descriptions of form-meaning pairings, but will also include purely formal objects that have no meaning associated with them. Substantive idioms now pose no problem, since trees containing multiple words can be described in a single place, without privileging one of the words over the others.

By way of illustration, Figures 4 and 5 show (simplified) constructional LFG entries for *kicks the bucket* and *pulls strings*. A number of conventions are employed here. Firstly, for the sake of exposition, I use diagrams of c-structure and f-structure to stand in for the full list of constraints which describe these structures – for the
formal details, see Findlay 2019, ch. 5 and Findlay to appear, §7. Of course, this shorthand has some limitations. For example, pull strings can also be passivised, separated by wh-questioning and relativisation, etc., and these options are not represented by such a static diagram. There are different ways of permitting this flexibility. Most naturally, perhaps, the description of c-structure in the lexical entry can contain disjunctions over permitted elementary trees, organised in templates in an appropriate hierarchy.\textsuperscript{36} This is equivalent to the standard approach in LTAG of using a metagrammar which captures generalisations across elementary trees (e.g. Crabbé \textit{et al.} 2013). Another approach, that employed by Findlay (2019, 243–258), is to use lexical rules to map correspondences between different types of elementary tree. Whichever is used, we can constrain different idioms according to their different levels of flexibility, either by simply excluding the relevant structures from their descriptions, or by marking them so as to make them incompatible with the relevant lexical rules (Findlay 2019, 257–258).\textsuperscript{37}

The second convention employed in Figures 4 and 5 is the use of simplified c-structures which follow X-bar theory even more loosely.

\textsuperscript{36}Note that the TAG approach to long-distance dependencies involves representing such dependencies locally, in an elementary tree; the filler and its gap can then be separated by adjunction of auxiliary trees between them. This means that the tree family of a verb will include trees where its arguments are questioned, topicalised, relativised on, etc. See Abeillé and Rambow 2000 for an introduction to TAG, including the treatment of long-distance dependencies.

\textsuperscript{37}It might be thought that explicitly describing such differences in syntactic flexibility in the grammar misses a generalisation: after all, as alluded to in the discussion of LA above, syntactic flexibility in idioms is supposed to correspond to semantic decomposability, as suggested by Nunberg \textit{et al.} (1994) and assumed in much subsequent work. In fact, the empirical landscape is much more complex than this simple bifurcation would suggest. Fraser (1970), for instance, suggests a six-way classification of syntactic flexibility in idioms. In my own idiolect, it seems that some decomposable idioms are more flexible than others – for example, pull strings is far happier separated by relativisation or topicalisation than spill the beans. And Bargmann and Sailer (2018, 4, 20–21) present examples of non-decomposable idioms in German and English exhibiting syntactic flexibility. While there may ultimately be a semantic explanation for all of this, it does not seem unreasonable at present to allow for the grammar itself to have fine-grained control over syntactic flexibility.
than is common in LFG. This is both because many intervening bar-
level nodes become unnecessary in a TAG as compared to a CFG, and
in order to save space.

Figure 4:
Constructional
LFG entry for
\textit{kicks the bucket}

Figure 5:
Constructional
LFG entry for
\textit{pulls strings}

The third convention is the use of dashed lines in c-structures to
represent simple dominance rather than immediate dominance: this
enables adjunction at these nodes (see Vijay-Shanker 1992, 487–488
and Findlay 2019, 219–221), but if nothing is adjoined then the two
nodes will be unified.
The fourth convention is that, to avoid clutter, I only show the \( \phi \) projection from maximal projections at c-structure to embedded f-structures – assume therefore that all undecorated maximal projections at c-structure map to the outermost f-structure shown, and that unannotated daughter nodes share the projection of their ancestors.

Finally, I only show c- and f-structures, along with the Glue Semantics meaning constructors, but of course full entries could also include information at other levels of representation within the projection architecture.

Turning now to the entries themselves, we see that the parallel representations of LFG allow us to illustrate what is the same and what is different across these two idioms. The fact that they both share the same surface form, that of a normal transitive VP, is shown by their c-structures, which are almost identical (the only difference is that the bucket already has its determiner fixed in the idiom, whereas the determiner position of strings is open). The fact that kick the bucket cannot be decomposed but pull strings can is represented by (i) the latter having an articulated f-structure where the former does not, and (ii) by the latter contributing two different meaning constructors where the former only contributes one.

Both idioms take one external argument; for example, either of the descriptions in Figures 4 or 5 can combine with the entry for Jadzia in Figure 6, whose root node matches the open NP slot, and whose f-structure therefore unifies with the f-structure corresponding to that node. The resulting structures and Glue proof for Jadzia kicks the bucket are shown in Figure 7.

38 This is exactly the kind of shared inheritance that would be captured in TAG by the metagrammar, and in constructional LFG by the template hierarchy.
Jamie Y. Findlay

Figure 7: Structures and Glue proof for Jadzia kicks the bucket

Space precludes a full exploration of the possibilities of this new framework here, but see Findlay 2019, ch. 6 for a detailed demonstration of its application to a variety of substantive idioms, both verbal and non-verbal. 39 Hopefully what is clear is that by replacing the CFG standardly used to describe LFG’s c-structure with something more expressive, it is straightforward to fill in the gaps in LFG’s conception of EDL, extending it to every level of representation, and making LFG fully compatible with the assumptions of CxG.

39 One area which necessitates further exploration is the challenge of non-configurational languages for a TAG-based c-structure. This is a particularly pressing concern for LFG, given that its treatment of non-configurationality is one of the parade examples of LFG’s utility as a framework. Although free word order languages go beyond the capabilities of TAG (Becker et al. 1991, 21–23), I am optimistic that, given the additional power of LFG, a suitably relaxed set of tree descriptions (e.g. removing statements of precedence relations from lexical entries so that order is underspecified in elementary trees) would be enough for constructional LFG to solve this problem. Nevertheless, this must be left for future work. Interestingly, some of the proposed extensions to TAG for tackling these problematic data (e.g. Multi-Component TAG: Weir 1988) are equivalent to LCFRSs (Kallmeyer 2010, 3), the same level of complexity attained by the tractable LFG of Wedekind and Kaplan (2020).
Because of the flexibility LFG permits in whether constraints are associated with lexical entries or with phrase-structure rules, the framework already has the ability to associate meaning with either words or phrases. It is therefore very capable of describing things like argument structure constructions and formal idioms. However, as idioms become more substantive, the framework begins to struggle. Although some substantive idioms can be treated lexically, as ‘words with spaces’, many cannot, and the most natural LFG solution, the lexical ambiguity approach, flies in the face of CxG dogma. The best solution, therefore, is to replace the unnecessarily restrictive CFG base of LFG with a more expressive TAG. By doing this, we give LFG the power to describe any kind of construction, formal or substantive, in a single place, just as is required of a CxG.

CONCLUSION

This paper has aimed to demonstrate that Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) is a suitable framework for formalising Construction Grammar (CxG). I began by discussing some central assumptions of CxG, and then showed that LFG also subscribes to many of them. One area of disagreement is over the principle of Lexical Integrity (LI), which states that there is a strict separation between morphology and syntax. We saw that in fact both camps need to cede ground: LI in the strictest sense is too rigid, but a total abandonment of the morphology-syntax divide cannot be justified either.

Recent work in LFG (Asudeh et al. 2013) supports the contention that LFG is suitable for formalising CxG, in that it shows that the framework already has the capacity to handle many constructional phenomena. However, it turns out that this capacity is limited to formal idioms, and that substantive idioms are much more trouble. But if the context-free base of LFG is replaced with a more expressive formalism (in this case, a description-based TAG), LFG acquires the ability to describe arbitrarily large structures pairing phonological form with semantic content, enabling it to handle substantive idioms just as well.
as formal ones. In this new version of LFG, the morphology-syntax divide is maintained, but the lexicon-grammar distinction is collapsed: since parsing just involves combining and satisfying stored collections of constraints, the lexicon, in a very real sense, is the grammar. Perhaps ironically, then, taking a more constructional view of things emphasises the lexical aspect of Lexical Functional Grammar.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was carried out while I was employed under a Research Council of Norway grant (number 300495, “Universal Natural Language Understanding”), which I gratefully acknowledge. The seeds of this paper were sown several years earlier, however, during my doctoral research: this was funded by a UK Arts and Humanities Research Council studentship (grant reference AH/L503885/1), and owes much to my fantastic supervisors, Ash Asudeh and Mary Dalrymple. I would also like to thank the participants in the Workshop on Constructional Approaches in Formal Grammar at ICCG11 for their helpful and constructive comments and discussion, along with the three tremendously diligent JLM reviewers. Lastly, my thanks go to Laura Michaelis, Adam Przepiórkowski, and Manfred Sailer for their time and insights. Of course, acknowledgement here is no expectation of endorsement, and any errors in this work remain, as ever, my responsibility alone.

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[ 261 ]
Jamie Y. Findlay


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Jamie Y. Findlay (2023), Lexical Functional Grammar as a Construction Grammar, Journal of Language Modelling, 11(2):197–266
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